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Eyewitness evidence is often important in criminal cases, but false or misleading eyewitness 
evidence is known to be a leading cause of wrongful convictions. One explanation for 
mistakes that jurors are making when evaluating eyewitness evidence is their lack of accurate 
knowledge relating to false memory. This article examines lay beliefs relating to memory and 
ways in which they diverge from expert consensus. It identifies ways in which current 
directions provided to jurors in this area are likely to be deficient in influencing juror 
knowledge and in helping them apply that knowledge in a case context, and develops criteria 
that can be used to assess the likely effectiveness of directions. A new evidence-based 
training direction is designed based on these criteria, and tested in a mock jury study 
(N=411). Results suggest that the proposed direction is more effective than a basic direction 







Evaluating Witness Testimony: Juror Knowledge, False Memory, and the Utility of 
Evidence-Based Directions 
Many modern common-law jurisdictions rely on lay juries to make determinations of fact in 
criminal cases (Helm & Hans, 2019). In making these determinations jurors are frequently 
required to hear and evaluate evidence from eyewitnesses to alleged crimes. Research 
suggests that jurors tend to rely heavily on this evidence (Cutler & Penrod, 1999).  
Traditionally, juries have been left to make judgments about the credibility of such evidence 
(including judgments of their truthfulness and memory accuracy) without assistance from 
experts. For example, in a House of Lord’s judgment in England and Wales, Lord Hobhouse 
stated: “The courts should be cautious about admitting evidence from psychologists, however 
eminent, as to the credibility of witnesses. The assessment of the truth of verbal evidence, 
save in a very small number of exceptional circumstances, is a matter for the jury” (R v 
Pendleton, 2002). This approach is designed to protect the independence of the jury and to 
avoid juror judgment being subsumed by expert judgment. It is based on the assumption that 
jurors, as people themselves, have experience that makes them well-placed to assess the 
credibility of other people (e.g. see JH and TG, ‘A witness’s ability to remember events, 
absent special considerations arising from the period of early childhood amnesia, will 
ordinarily be well within the experience of jurors.’)  
 
However, research in both law and cognitive science shows that while laypeople do have 
their own experiences of both memory and deception, they face predictable difficulties when 
evaluating the memory and truthfulness of others. These difficulties are borne out in real 
cases – in both the United States and United Kingdom, for example, false or misleading 
eyewitness testimony has been identified as a leading cause of wrongful conviction (UK 
Miscarriages of Justice Registry 2021; National Registry of Exonerations 2021, see also 
Garrett, 2012; Wells et al., 2006). In many ways, these difficulties are not surprising. Years 
of research on memory in the behavioral sciences has shown that memory is highly complex, 
and that accurately distinguishing true and false memory (i.e. true memory from apparent 
recollection of something that did not actually occur) is hugely challenging. In fact, even 
experts in controlled experiments struggle to make such distinctions accurately (see, for 
example; Ceci et al., 1994). The extent to which laypeople have experienced, and are 
conscious of having experienced, false memory is also unclear. False memory is not 
necessarily well within the experience of jurors. 
 
Importantly for the jury system, research specifically shows that laypeople hold beliefs about 
false memory that are out of line with established and extensive empirical research that has 
been conducted in the area. As a result, jurors are likely to be examining memory with a poor 
understanding of the cues that suggest a memory could be false. Thus, jurors are likely to be 
making decisions that are clearly at odds with conclusions that would be drawn on the basis 
of established research. For example, in the case of R v Hallam, the appeals court noted that 
the eyewitness evidence upon which the jury had relied in convicting the defendant “was 
never very satisfactory” (R v Hallam, 2012, para 76). The fact jurors are provided with 
relatively little guidance when assessing memory makes it unsurprising that they make such 
mistakes, particularly when intuitive conceptions conflict with established knowledge in 
cognitive science. Presenting relevant information to jurors is likely to be helpful in this 
regard, but care must be taken to ensure that such information is presented in a way that (1) 
appropriately influences juror knowledge, and (2) can helpfully inform (but not dictate) their 
applied judgments in the context of a legal case. This paper focuses specifically on how legal 
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procedure can facilitate the presentation of information in this way, specifically in cases 
involving potential false memory.    
 
The first section of the paper examines likely discrepancies between layperson beliefs and 
empirical findings in the area of false memory in witnesses. The second part of the paper 
considers the extent to which current procedure relating to testimony addresses these 
discrepancies, with a focus on procedure in England and Wales. It suggests that to be 
effective in improving evaluations a direction must appropriately influence juror knowledge 
and facilitate the application of that knowledge in a case context. It then draws on 
psychological theory relating to memory and decision-making to show that current directions 
may be ineffective in both of these regards and to develop criteria for effective directions. 
The final part of the paper draws on these criteria to design and test an enhanced ‘training’ 
direction, compared to no direction or a basic direction, in a mock jury experiment. The 
results suggest that giving jurors a more detailed and evidence-based direction has the 
potential to minimize predictable weaknesses in their decision-making, without substituting 
trial by jury for trial by expert.  
 
Memory: Science vs. Public Perception 
 
Research over the last forty to fifty years has provided extensive insight into the malleability 
of memory, showing that memory is reconstructive. In other words, what is remembered is 
influenced by a variety of factors including perception, imagination, semantic memory, and 
beliefs (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Howe & Knott, 2015; Loftus, 2003). Some of the 
ways that memory might be altered are relatively intuitive and thus within the experience of 
jurors, while others may be less intuitive and therefore difficult to account for without 
additional guidance. Where jurors rely on their “common sense” without knowledge of the 
less intuitive causes and characteristics of false memory, they are susceptible to making 
decisions based on presumptions that are demonstrably false and do not align with 
established scientific findings (see, for example, Houston et al., 2013). Identifying areas in 
which lay opinion is likely to diverge from scientific consensus is important in understanding 
where jurors might need additional guidance in examining witness memory.  
 
The Science of False Memory 
 
When a person witnesses an event, that event is encoded in memory. However, research 
clearly shows that memory does not operate like a video recorder and that a witnesses’ 
memory will often not be a full and accurate description of an event. The accuracy of 
memory can be influenced by factors that affect how they encode what they have seen. These 
may include individual factors (such as whether the witness was scared or intoxicated) (e.g. 
Jores et al., 2019), circumstantial factors (such as how far away the event occurred from the 
witness and how well-lit the scene was) (Hope & Gabbert, 2019), and social factors (such as 
the sex, age group, and race of the witness and those involved in the event they are 
witnessing) (Yaros et al., 2019). These factors generally, with the potential exception of 
social factors, may be considered within the experience of laypeople. For example, people 
know that their memory for an event is likely to be worse when they viewed the event while 
intoxicated or stressed, while the lighting was bad, or at a significant distance.  
 
People are less likely to have experienced, or at least to have been conscious of experiencing, 
corruption of their memory after encoding. However, research clearly shows that memories 
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are not unchanging records of an event, that they can be altered once encoded, or even 
entirely implanted for events that did not take place (Clifasefi et al., 2007). 
 
Memory can be influenced, sometimes referred to as corrupted, in a number of ways. First, 
by suggestion from an external influence. This external influence may be leading questions in 
an interview, (Loftus et al.,1978), conversations with others (Gabbert et al., 2003), or relevant 
media coverage (Davis & Loftus, 2012). A long line of research has even shown that 
encouraging a people to think about non-events (events that did not really happen) can 
eventually lead them to believe the events did happen (sometimes at relatively high rates) 
(see, for example, Heaps & Nash, 2001; Thomas & Loftus, 2002; Wade et al., 2002). In some 
cases, the memories people report after having been influenced by suggestion are rich and 
detailed, and those reporting them have high confidence in their veracity (Loftus, 2003).  
 
An important phenomenon thought to contribute to these memories is source misattribution. 
Source misattribution occurs where a person is unable to accurately separate two or more 
sources of their memories (Ceci et al., 1994). Thus, a person may come to believe something 
due to having considered or thought about it. People can come to believe that an event that 
they have imagined or thought about actually took place, or that a person they considered 
having been at a crime scene was definitely there. Essentially, the image that people create in 
their minds when thinking about the event or person, is later confused for something that 
happened in reality.  
 
Research also shows that false memories can arise more spontaneously. For example, a false 
memory can arise where a person remembers the ‘gist’ of something that they have seen (e.g. 
an offender) (creating a familiarity) but not specific ‘verbatim’ details (precise recollection) 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). When this happens, a person can accept that a face they are shown 
is that of the offender where the face matches the relevant gist and so feels familiar, but 
sufficient verbatim details are not recalled to show that the familiar face is not a true match. 
This occurrence is not infrequent since gist memory for an event is thought to endure for 
longer than verbatim memory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). In some cases, a mistaken memory 
for verbatim details combined with familiarity (for example, the familiarity of a face) can 
result in strong but false recollective experiences. This phenomenon is predicted by a 
psychological theory of memory and decision-making known as Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT), 
and has been termed ‘phantom recollection’ (Brainerd et al., 2001). It has the potential to 
result in the confident identification of a suspect who is ‘gist-consistent’ with the true 
offender, despite that person not actually being the offender.  
 
Spontaneous false memory can also arise as a result of source monitoring errors (discussed 
above) or as a result of what is known as change blindness where a witness does not notice  
that perpetrator and a bystander are actually different people (Davis et al., 2008; Laney & 
Loftus, 2010). These errors can lead to an occurrence known as unconscious transference, or 
the familiar bystander effect. This effect refers to a memory error whereby a witness 
identifies a familiar, but innocent person, as an offender. For example, research has shown a 
tendency to misidentify an innocent bystander to a crime as an offender (See, for example, 
Davis et al., 2008; Ross et al., 1994; Ross, et al., 2006), or to identify a familiar person from 
an entirely different context as an offender (Thompson, 1988). 
 
Scientific research therefore establishes that false memory is a real possibility even where 
memory encoding took place in pristine conditions, and even in the absence of problematic 
identification procedures. Memory can be influenced by information obtained after an event 
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as well as the event itself, eyewitnesses sometimes identify as a culprit someone who they 
have seen in another situation or context, and confidence can be influenced by factors other 
than accuracy. Research conducted with memory experts has tested their endorsement of 
these, and other, propositions relating to memory. This research has generally shown memory 
experts to be supportive of these conclusions. For example, in one study conducted in 2006, 
94% of the 64 memory experts surveyed agreed that memory reflects not only what a witness 
saw but also information obtained later on; 81% agreed that eyewitnesses sometimes identify 
as a culprit someone who they have seen in another situation or context, and 95% agreed that 
confidence could be influenced by factors other than memory accuracy (Benton et al., 2006, 
see also Kassin et al., 2001). However, although laypeople may show relatively high rates of 
agreement with experts when considering factors influencing memory encoding and 
problematic identification procedures (e.g. Desmarais & Read, 2011), their beliefs relating to 
false memory created in other ways are far less consistent with expert opinion.  
 
Public Beliefs Relating to False Memory 
 
Data gathered from surveys with laypeople suggests that their opinions diverge from those of 
memory experts when considering false memory (see, for example, Kassin et al., 2001; Shaw 
et al., 1999; Simmons & Chabris, 2012). In the 2006 study by Benton et al., referenced 
above, the views of laypeople differed from those of experts. Specifically, 60% of the 111 
laypeople surveyed agreed that memory reflects not only what a witness saw but also 
information obtained later on (compared to 94% of experts); 30% agreed that eyewitnesses 
sometimes identify as a culprit someone who they have seen in another situation or context 
(compared to 81% of experts), and 50% agreed that confidence could be influenced by 
factors other than memory accuracy (compared to 95% of experts). Other research suggests 
that lay beliefs may come closer to expert beliefs, but still diverge relatively significantly.  A 
2012 meta-analysis examined responses from 23 surveys across multiple jurisdictions 
assessing lay knowledge of eyewitness issues that in total examined the beliefs of 4,669 
respondents (Desmarais & Read, 2011).  Of the 4,669 responses examined across multiple 
studies, 72% agreed that memory reflects not only what a witness saw but also information 
obtained later on; 63% agreed that eyewitnesses sometimes identify as a culprit someone who 
they have seen in another situation or context, and 73% agreed that confidence could be 
influenced by factors other than memory accuracy. The meta-analysis concluded that 
layperson knowledge relating to memory was improving over time, but that important 
divergences still exist, particularly for estimator variables (variables not under the control of 
the legal system), evaluation of which may still be “beyond the ken” of potential jurors.  
 
Research also suggests more generally that laypeople are over-confident in the accuracy of 
memory. In one telephone survey participated in by 1,838 people in the USA,  37.1% of 
respondents mostly agreed or strongly agreed that “In my opinion, the testimony of one 
confident eyewitness should be enough evidence to convict a defendant of a crime,” 63% of 
respondents mostly agreed or strongly agreed that “Human memory works like a video 
camera, accurately recording the events we see and hear so that we can review and inspect 
them later”, and almost 48% of respondents mostly agreed or strongly agreed that “Once you 
have experienced an event and formed a memory of it, that memory does not change” 
(Simons & Chabris, 2011). None of the 73 experts surveyed agreed with any of these 
statements (Simons & Chabris, 2011). The statements are also inconsistent with evaluations 
of the courts themselves. For example, in the USA in the 2011 case of Jersey v Henderson, 
the court stated that “We are convinced from the scientific evidence in the record that 
memory is malleable, and that an array of variables can affect and dilute memory and lead to 
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misidentifications.” Therefore, the phenomenon of false memory is widely understood and 
accepted in the legal context, but not by those who are actually assessing the memory and 
credibility of witnesses. It is important to consider the extent to which this lack of 
understanding is accounted for and corrected by legal procedure.  
 




In 1976, a departmental committee chaired by Lord Devlin concluded that there was a special 
risk of wrongful conviction in cases reliant on eyewitness identification evidence due to the 
fact that even a witness who is sincerely convinced that they are making a correct 
identification may “not infrequently” be mistaken (Devlin, 1976). Since that report was 
published, the courts and legislature in England and Wales have taken steps designed to 
reduce the risk of wrongful convictions arising as a result of mistaken identifications. In the 
area of juror evaluations, a specially constituted Court of Appeal issued guidelines for use in 
cases reliant on witness identification evidence (R v Turnbull, 1977). The guidelines oblige 
the court to halt cases in which the prosecution relies on very weak witness identification 
evidence, and to deliver a direction to the jury in other cases reliant entirely or substantially 
on witness identification (Bromby et al., 2007). This direction is usually delivered after 
witness testimony is presented to the jury, although an early or summary direction may be 
given at the outset of a case where helpful (Judicial College, 2020). The direction warns 
jurors of the special need for caution before convicting a defendant in reliance on the 
correctness of the identification. The direction can debunk relevant memory “myths” (such as 
the fact that a confident witness is always reliable), list potential influential encoding factors, 
or explain relevant discrepancies in witness statements. The specific content of a Turnbull 
direction will vary by case. Details of how Turnbull directions should be given are contained 
in the Judicial College Crown Court Compendium (Judicial College, 2020). An illustrative 
example of Turnbull direction content is also given in this compendium, and is reproduced in 
Appendix 1. 
 
In addition to the use of directions, it is possible to call expert witnesses to explain memory 
to jurors and judges. However, this is only permitted in rare cases, since it was held in R v 
Turner that where triers of fact can form their own opinion without the assistance of an 
expert, the matter in question being within their own experience and knowledge, opinion 
evidence of an expert is unnecessary and therefore inadmissible (R v Turner, 1975). Memory 
is generally considered to be within the experience of jurors (see JH and TG) and thus experts 
cannot be called to give an opinion on the likely deterioration of the memory of an ordinary 
witness (R v Browning, 1995). Thus, cases involving memory (with the exception of cases 
involving childhood amnesia, see R v H (JR) (2006)), are considered better dealt with by an 
educative judicial direction, as discussed above. However, existing research in the US context 
shows that judicial directions are not necessarily effective in achieving desired effects (Dillon 
et al., 2017; Papailiou et al 2015). It is therefore important to carefully design and evaluate 
relevant directions.   
 
Evaluating Current Procedure 
 
In order to be effective, directions relating to witness memory must both appropriately alter 
juror knowledge relating to witness memory, and facilitate the application of that knowledge 
in a case context. It is not clear that directions such as those mandated by R v Turnbull do 
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either, and an examination of psychological theory relating to memory and decision-making 
suggests that they risk being ineffective. The continued persistence of miscarriages of justice 
since 1976, for example the cases of Joseph Otoo (Innocent.org, 2000), Victor Nealon (R v 
Nealon, 2014), John Kamara (R v Kamara, 2000), and Sam Hallam (R v Hallam, 2012), 
supports this contention (for more information on miscarriages of justice arising as the result 
of eyewitness identifications see Helm, 2021).  
 
First, it is worth noting briefly that one problem with Turnbull guidelines is that their 
effectiveness depends heavily on the discretion of judges, who are themselves not memory 
experts. Research with judges in the United States (whose knowledge may differ from judges 
in England and Wales) highlights a risk that judicial knowledge may differ from expert 
knowledge in important ways (e.g. Wise and Safer, 2004). Difficulties are also evident in real 
cases, for example the case of R v Hallam, where a case was allowed to continue despite 
relying substantially on eyewitness evidence that the Court of Appeal noted was “never very 
satisfactory.” Increasingly, judges are being offered training designed to improve their ability 
to assess the potential for false memory and thus their ability to appropriately handle cases 
involving such memory. This ability might be further improved by updating the content of 
Turnbull directions to appropriately reflect more modern knowledge and circumstances (e.g. 
Ruva et al., 2007), and as a result allowing judges to deliver the most appropriate and up to 
date information to jurors. However, even where accurate information is presented to jurors 
in appropriate cases, there remain problems with delivering the information in the current 
form, as a relatively superficial judicial direction usually following the presentation of 
evidence.  
 
Directions May Not Effectively Influence Juror Knowledge 
 
Existing directions are unlikely to effectively update juror beliefs relating to memory. In 
these directions, the conclusions of relevant research are presented as facts without sufficient 
underlying background to persuade jurors of their veracity and importance. In order for jurors 
to update their beliefs, it is likely that they will need more explanation and information, 
particularly since jurors do have their own “common-sense” intuitions about memory that 
need to be dispelled. Psychological theory and research provide support for this contention. 
One relevant psychological model is Petty and Cacioppo’s Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(ELM) (Petty & Cacipppo, 1980). This model is a dual process model describing attitude 
change. According to the model, attitude change can occur either via a central route or a 
peripheral route. Under the central route, attitude change results from a person’s careful and 
thoughtful consideration of the merits of information. The central route involves an 
individual deeply considering and evaluating the information that they have received and 
coming to agree with it. Under the peripheral route, attitude change results from an 
association of the information with positive or negative cues that allow a person to make 
inferences about the merits of a position (e.g. assessments of the credibility of the source of 
information). The information currently presented in judicial directions such as Turnbull 
directions is not sufficiently detailed in terms of background and context to allow jurors to 
consider deeply for themselves whether they agree with the information in the directions, and 
therefore will not change juror beliefs via the central route. For example, telling jurors that a 
confident witness may be accurate does not give them meaningful information to enable them 
to evaluate and substantiate this claim. Thus, whether jurors update their beliefs based on a 
direction will depend on whether their attitudes are changed via the peripheral route. Whether 
attitude change occurs will therefore depend on the presence of cues that jurors feel 
comfortable drawing influences from. The legal system relies on jurors being sufficiently 
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influenced by the “cue” of judicial authority, and changing their beliefs based on the 
authority of the judge providing them with information. However, this cue may not be 
sufficient in the context of a legal case, where positions towards the case and the defendant 
may be polarised even prior to the directions being given. Research specifically suggests that 
beliefs in the authority and credibility of experts are influenced by existing beliefs (e.g. 
Kahan et al., 2011) and that initial impressions of a case can influence interpretations of 
information given subsequently (Carlson & Russo, 2001). There is therefore a significant risk 
that jurors will find the authority of the judge sufficiently important to update their beliefs 
only where doing so supports their existing evaluations of case evidence (which may also be 
influenced by biases and pre-existing attitudes, see e.g. Lecci and Myers, 2008), but not 
where it goes against them.   
 
Directions May Not Effectively Facilitate the Application of Information Given to Case 
Facts  
 
According to the Story Model, the leading model of jury decision-making, jurors decide cases 
through imposing a narrative “story” organisation on trial information (Pennington & Hastie, 
1981; 1986; 1988). Individual pieces of evidence are given meaning through their 
incorporation into narratives that explain what happened, and verdicts are reached through 
matching the best fitting narrative (measured in terms of coverage, coherence, uniqueness, 
and goodness-of-fit) with a verdict category (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). The juror decision-
making process therefore involves fitting evidence into narratives, learning about verdict 
categories, and matching the story to the best fitting verdict category. Empirical research 
provides support for this explanation of decision-making processes in jurors. For example, 
research suggests that juror mental representations of evidence have a story structure (in 
which causal and intentional relations between different alleged events are central), that 
jurors are more likely to remember evidence that is consistent with the story associated with 
their verdict, and that jurors are likely to find evidence more important where that evidence 
has a causal role in the story that is associated with their verdict (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). 
This understanding of jury decision-making, combined with other research, highlights several 
deficiencies in existing directions and suggests that existing directions are unlikely to 
effectively facilitate the application of information given to case facts. 
 
First, the information given in existing directions is not sufficiently detailed to allow jurors to 
get a good sense of when a particular concern might apply and how that concern might fit 
into an overall narrative. For example, jurors may be told that a confident witness is not 
necessarily accurate and that they should bear this in mind when considering the testimony of 
a particular confident witness. However, jurors are not given more detailed information about 
the types of situation in which existing research has shown that such witnesses may not be 
reliable, or to help them know how to evaluate whether a particular confident witness is 
accurate. This information is important, since the relationship between accuracy and 
confidence is complicated and is moderated by other factors (see e.g. Wells et al., 2006).  
 
Second, there is a risk that the information presented in judicial directions is presented in a 
way that is too cursory to be effectively integrated into juror story construction. According to 
FTT, decision-making in adults is primarily driven by the gist, or meaning attributed to 
information, rather than the verbatim information itself (Reyna, 2012). FTT extends the 
original story model by introducing the broader concept of mental representation. The gist of 
the narrative (the “story”) connects all of the dots together and is the highest level of gist. 
However, gist is not just the end product of a deliberative process but is extracted throughout 
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the process from individual pieces of evidence. Put simply, jurors are expected to rely on the 
meaning they extract from evidence rather than the verbatim evidence itself (e.g. Helm et al., 
2017). Therefore, making evidence meaningful to jurors and ensuring the meaning that they 
extract from evidence is appropriate is key to facilitating informed decision-making. The 
importance of making directions meaningful to jurors is also confirmed by research from 
other contexts showing that jurors attend more to jury directions where it is explained why 
they are being given (Kassin & Sommers, 1997; Steblay et al., 2006).  
 
However, current Turnbull directions do not present information to jurors in a way that is 
conducive to them extracting meaning from it appropriately. Conclusions from a complex 
body of research are presented in quite a simplistic way, as stated conclusions. Relatively 
limited information about the types of cues that may be indicative of whether a particular 
concern should apply in a particular case is given. For example, as noted above, a judge may 
warn the jury that even a witness who is very confident may be incorrect. However, without 
being told why this might be the case or being given examples of the types of other case in 
which memory has been impaired in this way, it is likely to be difficult for jurors to extract 
meaning from it appropriately. This lack of contextualization could lead to (1) jurors either 
being dismissive of all witness evidence (an effect that has been demonstrated when 
examining instructions on eyewitness testimony in the US context, see e.g. Dillon et al., 
2017; Papailiou et al., 2015), (2) jurors not attributing meaning to the information at all and 
therefore neglecting it in their decision making, or (3) jurors attributing meaning to the 
information in a biased way -  judging the importance of the warning based on their unrelated 
conceptions of the case (e.g. if they feel overall that the defendant seems guilty they might 
conclude that although confident witnesses can be wrong, the confidence in the case at hand 
does signal accuracy). This phenomenon can be caused by motivated cognition (see e.g. 
Kahan et al., 2011) and confirmatory biases (Carlson & Russo, 2001).  
 
Third, where directions are not given prior to the presentation of evidence, they risk being 
ineffective. Where a judge gives the jury instructions on matters of law, for example on the 
presumption of innocence and the standard of proof, this information forms part of the story 
classification stage where jurors match their story with a verdict category (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1992). So, a story will be a match for the guilty verdict category only if that story is 
considered a fit “beyond a reasonable doubt.” However, where a judge gives information 
relating to the quality of evidence in a case, this information relates to the story construction 
and therefore needs to inform story construction in order to be effective. However, it is 
difficult for the information to influence story construction when it is presented after story 
construction has taken place for individual jurors. Presenting the information after story 
construction presents a risk that the value attributed to information will be coloured by its fit 
with the narratives that jurors have already begun constructing. The suggestion that directions 
should consistently be given at the outset of a case in order to ensure effectiveness is 
supported by an existing body of research showing that directions are more effective when 
given ‘pre-instruction,’ meaning before evidence is presented (Chalmers & Leverick, 2018).   
 
Criteria for More Effective Directions 
 
If the contentions described above are correct, directions given to jurors should be more 
effective in updating beliefs and facilitating appropriate application to facts if they: 
 
• Provide jurors with sufficient information to allow them to evaluate the case for the 
conclusions presented and update their beliefs accordingly; 
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• provide jurors with sufficient information to allow them to understand the types of 
case in which particular concerns may be important, and why; and 
• are consistently given prior to the presentation or case evidence in order to inform 
juror narrative construction from evidence, and to reduce effects of motivated 
cognition or confirmatory bias in juror interpretation and analysis of information 
given.  
 
Essentially, directions should be viewed as a form of training for jurors rather than relatively 
simple warnings. This training has the potential to empower jurors with the information and 
context needed to more appropriately assess testimony in a case context. The suggestion of 
training jurors has already been made in other contexts (see, for example, Koehler, 2006; 
Reed, 2007).  
 
In the context of complex numerical intervention, suggestions to help jurors truly understand 
the meaning of information they are presented with, have included using visual aids and 
graphs (Helm et al., 2017; see also Gaissmaier et al., 2012). These visual aids allow jurors to 
more appropriately grasp bottom-line meaning of information. In the context of eyewitness 
testimony, such aids are unlikely to be appropriate since the information cannot be 
communicated graphically. Instead, conveying key information on the research behind 
directions relating to memory and clear representative examples of cases in which memory 
errors have been found should be considered. For example, rather than telling jurors that it is 
possible for a witness to mistakenly identify a defendant because of having seen or heard 
about the defendant in another context, a judge might tell jurors that memory mistakes occur 
where a person mistakenly identifies someone who feels familiar to them, this effect occurs 
because of what are known as source monitoring mistakes…, these are the kind of cases that 
the effect has been demonstrated in… In this way, the information relating to memory 
becomes a meaningful tool that jurors can use to appropriately inform their evaluation of 
evidence as it is presented. This type of direction will be referred to as a ‘training direction.’ 
 
The next section of this paper tests a short training direction and analyses its influence on 
decisions when compared to no direction being given, and when compared to a briefer 
direction more like a Turnbull direction, but presented prior to case evidence. 
 




Research Design  
 
An online mock jury experiment utilising a between-subjects design was conducted in order 
to test the potential effectiveness of an enhanced training direction on juror decisions. Mock 
jurors each read a brief case vignette in a case reliant almost exclusively on evidence from 
two witnesses. The experiment utilised a 2 (witness evidence strength) x 3 (direction given) 
design. Vignettes participants read varied in terms of the strength of the witness evidence in 
the case (strong eyewitness evidence or weak eyewitness evidence), and the direction jurors 
received (no direction, a basic direction, or a ‘training’ direction designed in accordance with 
the criteria above). Mock jurors delivered a verdict in the case, and rated their agreement with 
statements about eyewitness memory (which was examined to assess how directions 





Directions. The basic directions were designed to present mock jurors with research 
conclusions from a judge, without giving background information or examples. Jurors were 
told that they should consider the fact that in cases involving eyewitness evidence there was a 
risk of injustice and so care should be taken when considering the evidence. They were also 
given a number of more specific warnings – that a witness who is honest and convinced of 
something may still be wrong, that a convincing witness may still be wrong, that a witness 
who recognises a defendant may be wrong even where they know the defendant well, and 
that it is possible to mistakenly identify a defendant because of having seen or heard about 
them in another context. The training directions focused on specifically describing research 
on memory to jurors, in an attempt to illustrate the same information about memory but in a 
more contextualised way. Jurors were told that research on memory distortion has shown that 
information obtained after an event can change what a person remembers and even create 
false memories, and that memory can be inaccurate even when a witness is being honest. 
They were then given accessible examples from research on false memories and descriptions 
of explanations given for these false memories having been formed (specifically focused on 
source monitoring and change blindness, described above). Full versions of both directions 
are included in Appendix 2.  
 
Case vignettes. The case vignettes utilised were loosely based on the case of Sam Hallam 
who was convicted of murder in 2005 largely on the basis of witness testimony. This 
conviction was quashed on a second appeal in 2012 (see R v Hallam, 2012).  The vignettes 
used were simplified and involved only two of the four witnesses at the original trial (the two 
witnesses identified by the Court of Appeal as being the key witnesses in the case). This 
simplification was done in order to minimize confounding by other case features, so that 
analyses could focus closely on specific aspects of witness testimony. The case was therefore 
used not because this work was intended to be an accurate replica of it or to lead to 
conclusions on it, but just because it provided a realistic case setting within which to explore 
potential eyewitness issues. In the case, a young person was killed in a fight involving a large 
number of youths. The defendant was linked to the attack by evidence from two 
eyewitnesses, and had initially given an incorrect alibi.  
 
In the strong witness evidence condition, both witnesses linked the same person (the 
defendant) to the murder immediately after the event (one having seen him hit the witness 
with the murder weapon, and another having seen him moving towards the victim with the 
murder weapon immediately before the attack) and without colluding with one another. There 
were no indications given of any external influence with the potential to corrupt memory. 
Therefore, in this case a greater understanding of false memory would not necessarily be 
expected to result in a reduction in guilty verdicts.   
  
In the weak witness evidence condition, the first witness did not mention the defendant 
initially and only identified him after she had seen him in the street the next day and the 
second witness did not mention the defendant initially and only identified the defendant after 
he had heard his name from the first witness. The weak evidence condition was designed to 
represent a situation with a clear possibility of memory corruption following the event itself, 
based on the research discussed above. To ensure this case did represent a case in which the 
eyewitness evidence, in the opinion of memory experts, would not substantiate a guilty 
verdict, an initial pilot of the case materials was run with memory experts. Eight memory 
experts reviewed the case, having been recruited via emails sent to academics working on 
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research relating to memory and law at PhD level or above (identified by being authors of 
academic publications in memory and law, or being researchers in the research groups of 
authors of academic publications in memory and law). When asked to indicate whether they 
thought that the defendant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt, all of the memory experts 
indicated that they thought that the defendant was not guilty.  
 
Memory questions. Participants were asked to rate their agreement with statements relating 
to false memory examined in eyewitness research discussed in Part 1 of this paper. 
Specifically, participants were asked to rate their agreement (agree, disagree, don’t know) 
with the following statements: 
 
Eyewitness testimony about an event often reflects not only what they actually saw but also 
information they obtained later on. 
 
Eyewitnesses sometimes identify as a culprit someone they have seen in another situation or 
context. 
 
An eyewitness’s confidence can be influenced by factors that are unrelated to identification 
accuracy.  
 
In order to ensure that expert consensus continues to suggest that each of these statements are 
true, we asked each of the eight memory experts who reviewed our case materials to indicate 
their agreement with the statements. 87.5% of the experts (7/8) agreed with the first and third 




Participants were 411 adults, recruited online using the Prolific survey platform. Participants 
completed the study online, and participation took approximately fifteen minutes. 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 86 (M = 35.13, SD = 12.87). All participants were 
British. 89.8% identified as White, 3.9% identified as Asian, 2.9% identified as Black, and 
3.4% identified as another ethnic group or preferred not to indicate their ethnic group. 27.3% 
identified as male, 72.3% identified as female, and .5% identified as another gender group 




Participants were first shown their instruction (no instruction, basic instruction delivered by 
judge, or training instruction delivered by judge) followed by the case facts and evidence 
(either the weak case or the strong case). They were given an instruction on the relevant law 
(requiring the defendant to have killed another person with the intention to kill or the 
intention to cause grievous bodily harm) and standard of proof (beyond reasonable doubt) 
and were asked to indicate whether they would find the defendant guilty or not guilty. They 
were also asked to indicate whether they thought that the defendant was one of the people 
responsible for the murder (definitely yes, probably yes, might or might not, probably not, or 
definitely not). After delivering a verdict they were asked some questions about their 






This research gained ethical approval from the independent Ethics Committee at the 
University of Exeter. Participation was anonymous and all participants provided informed 




Do Directions Influence Knowledge? 
 
First, analyses examined differences in the agreement with the three memory statements 
presented to participants, in order to assess how the directions influenced juror knowledge 
relating to false memory. For each of the three memory statements, logistic regression 
analyses were used to examine the extent to which each direction increased agreement with 
the statement when compared to the no direction condition. The direction variable was 
dummy coded and entered into analysis predicting statement agreement as a no direction / 
basic direction comparison, and a no direction / training direction comparison. Analyses were 
also conducted controlling for evidence strength, and the significance of predictors was not 
affected.  
 
Eyewitness testimony about an event often reflects not only what they actually saw 
but also information they obtained later on. 67.8% of participants in the no direction 
condition agreed that eyewitness testimony about an event often reflects not only what they 
actually saw but also information they obtained later on. Regression results did not indicate a 
greater proportion of participants endorsing this statement in the basic direction condition 
when compared to the no direction condition. Results did indicate a greater proportion of 
participants endorsing this statement in the training direction condition when compared to the 
no direction condition, although this effect just missed two-tailed statistical significance (B = 
.52, SE = .27, Wald = 3.74, OR = 1.69, p = .05). 78% of participants who received the 
training direction agreed with this statement compared to the 67.8% agreement rate in the no 
direction group (χ2 = 3.78, p =.05).   
 
Eyewitnesses sometimes identify as a culprit someone that have seen in another 
situation or context. 48.6% of participants in the no direction condition agreed that 
eyewitnesses sometimes identify as a culprit someone that they have seen in another situation 
or context. Regression results did not indicate a greater proportion of participants endorsing 
this statement in the basic direction condition when compared to the no direction condition. 
However, results did indicate a greater proportion of participants endorsing this statement in 
the training direction condition when compared to the no direction condition (B = .95, SE = 
.25, Wald = 14.49, OR = 2.58, p <.001). 70.9% of participants who received the training 
direction agreed with this statement compared to the 48.6% agreement rate in the no direction 
group (χ2 = 14.80, p <.001).   
 
An eyewitness’s confidence can be influenced by factors that are unrelated to 
identification accuracy. 74.0% of participants in the no direction group agreed that an 
eyewitness’s confidence can be influenced by factors than are unrelated to identification 
accuracy. Regression results did not indicate a greater proportion of participants endorsing 
this statement in the basic direction condition when compared to the no direction condition. 
However, results did indicate a greater proportion of participants endorsing this statement in 
the training direction condition when compared to the no direction condition (B = .82, SE = 
.31, Wald = 6.89, OR = 2.26, p = .01). 86.5% of participants who received the training 
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direction agreed with this statement compared to the 74.0% agreement rate in the no direction 
group (χ2 =7.10, p =.01).   
 
Figure 1 displays agreement rates with each of the three statements in each of the three 
direction conditions in this experiment alongside the expert and layperson agreement rates 
presented in Benton et al., 2006 (that utilised the same questions and response scale). Even 
participants in the no direction condition tended to agree with the statements more than those 
in the Benton et al. study. This difference could reflect increasing awareness of eyewitness 




Figure 1: Agreement rates with statements about memory from this study, and Benton et al., 
2006.  
 
Three follow-up logistic regression analyses confirmed that endorsement of each of the 
statements relating to eyewitness testimony was associated with verdict (regressions were run 
separately due to covariance between endorsements of each statement). In each regression, 
statement endorsement significantly predicted verdict such that endorsement was associated 
with a lower chance of delivering a guilty verdict (Eyewitness testimony about an event often 
reflects not only what they actually saw but also information they obtained later on: B = 1.06, 
SE = .24, Wald = 20.20, OR = 2.88, p <.001; Eyewitnesses sometimes identify as a culprit 
someone that have seen in another situation or context: B = .78, SE = .21, Wald = 14.64, OR 
= 2.19, p <.001; An eyewitness’s confidence can be influenced by factors that are unrelated 
to identification accuracy: B = 1.05, SE = .26, Wald = 16.39, OR = 2.87, p <.001).  
 
Do Directions Influence Application of Knowledge (Verdicts)? 
 
A logistic regression analysis was conducted to examine the influence of direction received 
and evidence strength on verdicts. If the directions are effective at facilitating application of 
the information given, we would expect them to influence verdicts in the weak evidence 
condition (where the information contained provides reasons to question the witness 
evidence) but to have less of an influence or no influence on verdicts in the strong condition 












Information obtained later influences
memory
Sometimes identify person from
other context
Confidence influenced by factors
other than accuracy
Experts (Benton et al) Laypeople (Benton et al) No direction Basic direction Training direction
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evidence). Predictors were evidence strength (weak or strong), two direction dummy 
variables (as above, direction was dummy coded in analyses into two comparison variables - 
a no direction / basic direction comparison, and a no direction / training direction 
comparison), and the interaction between evidence strength and each of the direction dummy 
variables.  The outcome variable was verdict (guilty or not guilty).  
 
This analysis revealed a significant main effect of evidence strength such that the rate of 
participants delivering a guilty verdict was significantly higher in the strong evidence 
condition (B = -1.31, SE = .36, Wald = 13.14, OR = .27, p < .001). 73.4% of participants in 
the strong evidence condition found the defendant guilty compared to 30.8% of participants 
in the weak evidence condition (χ2 =73.74, p <.001).  
 
The analysis also revealed a main effect of the no direction / training direction comparison, 
such that participants who received the training direction were significantly less likely to find 
the defendant guilty than participants who received no direction (B = .83, SE = .34, Wald = 
5.82, OR = .2.28, p = .016). 44.7% of participants in the training direction condition found 
the defendant guilty compared to 54.1% of participants in the no direction condition 
(although this difference was not significant in a simple chi-square analysis; χ2 =2.55, p 
=.11).  
 
The analysis also revealed a two-way interaction between evidence strength and the no 
direction / training direction comparison, that just missed two-tailed significance (B = -.89, 
SE = .53, Wald = 2.77, OR = .412, p = .096) (Figure 2). This effect was explored further 
since it was a predicted result (since the training direction, if effective, should reduce guilty 
verdicts in the weak evidence condition but not in the strong evidence condition). Follow-up 
chi-square analyses showed that the training direction did significantly reduce the proportion 
of guilty verdicts in the weak evidence condition (41.2% of participants in the no direction 
condition found the defendant guilty compared to 23.5% of participants in the training 
direction condition; χ2 =5.93, p =.01), but did not have an influence on the proportion of 
guilty verdicts in the strong evidence condition (72.1% of participants in the no direction 
condition found the defendant guilty compared to 73.3% of participants in the training 
direction condition; χ2 =.02, p =.88).  
 
 
Figure 2: Guilty verdicts by evidence condition and training direction. 
 
No other effects in the regression analysis were significant, indicating that the basic direction  
 did not significantly change the rates of guilty verdicts. A follow-up linear regression 
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defendant was one of the youths responsible for the victim’s death showed that both 
directions significantly decreased the extent to which mock jurors thought that the defendant 
was responsible (Basic Direction B = .28, SE = .13, β = .15, t(5,405) = 2.15, p =.032; 
Training Direction B = .432, SE = .12, β = .25, t(5,405) = 3.62, p <.001). This suggests that 
both suggestions may have some effect on beliefs relating to guilt, although only the training 




The results of this study provide support for the proposed use of more in-depth directions in 
relation to false memory in cases largely reliant on eyewitness testimony.  The training 
direction tested here increased agreement with scientific consensus on memory in all of the 
statements examined (although note this increase just missed statistical significance in the 
case of “Eyewitness testimony about an event often reflects not only what they actually saw 
but also information they obtained later on.”). The basic direction did not significantly 
increase agreement with scientific consensus, although qualitatively it did increase 
agreement, suggesting that such a direction may have a smaller effect but that this study did 
not have the power to detect it. In any case, the training direction was clearly more effective 
than the basic direction at increasing the extent to which juror beliefs were aligned with 
scientific consensus. Future research should fine-tune instructions to be maximally 
informative in relevant areas. 
 
 In addition, findings showed the training direction, but not the basic direction, influenced 
verdicts in the case. Specifically, in the weak evidence condition the training direction 
reduced the number of guilty verdicts, bringing the mock juror verdicts in line with expert 
judgment from the pilot study. Again, it may be that the basic direction did have a small 
effect that was not detected in this study, but the training direction clearly appears to be more 
effective in informing juror judgments. In the strong evidence condition, neither training 
direction significantly influenced the proportion of guilty verdicts. This finding suggests that 
the training direction is effective in helping jurors effectively identify an enhanced risk of 
false memory, rather than in just introducing general scepticism towards any eyewitness 
testimony.  
 
The mock jury study presented here should be viewed in light of some limitations. Most 
importantly, the presentation of case evidence differed from presentation in real cases in a 
number of ways and thus the study was limited in external validity (Lieberman et al., 2016). 
First, the case facts reviewed by participants were presented in summary form and read by 
participants, rather than being presented through direct and cross examination in court. 
Second, the materials were significantly simplified compared to the materials that would be 
viewed in a full trial. Third, mock jurors were aware that their decisions would not have 
implications for real people. As a result, the actual rates of guilty verdicts delivered by jurors 
are likely to be different from the rates that might be expected if a similar case were heard in 
court. However, the experiment isolated and studied an important component of juror 
decision-making, the evaluations of testimony involving potential false memory. The same 
basic decision processes are likely to underlie this part of juror decision-making in real cases 
(e.g. Sklansky, 2013) and research suggests that effects found when evidence is presented in 
written format are likely to persist when evidence is presented in a more realistic format 
(McAuliff et al., 2009). Thus, the research is informative despite the limited external validity. 
It should also be noted that in real cases jurors deliver verdicts as a group following 
deliberation processes and this study did not incorporate deliberations. Future work should 
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consider how the effects demonstrated might be influenced by deliberations, but research 
generally shows that individual juror verdicts are highly predictive of jury verdicts delivered 
following deliberations (e.g. Devine et al., 2016). This work therefore provides important 
initial insight that can be followed up by examining decisions in more realistic mock trials in 
future work.   
 
Translating findings into real procedure would involve both altering the content of directions 
and the timing of delivery. All directions in this study were delivered to participants prior to 
viewing case evidence which differs from current practice. As noted above, theory and 
previous research confirm that instructions delivered prior to the evaluation of evidence are 
likely to be more effective (see Chalmers & Leverick, 2018). Therefore, the effectiveness of 
the directions tested may be dependent on directions being given prior to evidence being 
presented. Although this may mark a change from typical practice, existing Judicial College 
guidance does recognise the possibility of delivering an early direction (Judicial College, 




   
Years of well-controlled experimental research, as well as evidence from real miscarriages of 
justice, shows that memory is reconstructive, that witnesses are susceptible to memory 
corruption following an event, and that witnesses can come to have false memories relating to 
an event. This research is informative in the legal system, where evaluations of witness 
testimony are important in the adjudication of crime. However, care must be taken to 
incorporate this evidence into the legal system in a way that will ensure that it is effective in 
improving adjudication. In the case of juries, it cannot be presumed that giving jurors 
relatively brief warnings about witness testimony will appropriately inform their beliefs or 
influence their judgments. In fact, experimental research testing juror instructions in the 
United States (e.g. Dillon et al., 2017) and psychological theory relating to memory and 
decision-making both suggest that simple directions given to jurors by judges are unlikely to 
work. Instead, directions should be developed that contextualise work on memory, provide 
illustrative examples from research and explain phenomena that have been observed in a 
simplified way. Such directions give jurors a sense of the gist of false memory – what it can 
look like, why it occurs, and how we know it exists. In this way the directions are sufficiently 
informative to update juror beliefs, and arm jurors with tools and context they can use in 
evaluating memory. Where jurors have understandable and contextualised information to use 
in evaluations, they are more likely to be influenced by this information and less likely to be 
influenced by biases and misperceptions.  
 
The directions explored in this study provide a starting point that can be built on in 
developing the directions provided to jurors both in England and Wales and in jury systems 
across the world. The direction here addressed potential false memory arising when there has 
been a delay between the observation of an event and the memory report. However, similar 
directions could be used in other areas in which juror judgments are likely to be influenced 
by misconceptions. For example, a common-sense approach suggests that witnesses who are 
inconsistent are likely to be lying or mistaken. However, research shows this inconsistency 
may be predictable in cases involving victims of trauma, particularly children, where memory 
blending can occur (Helm et al., 2018). More broadly, cohesive directions providing context 
and examples could even be helpful to dispel other “myths” relied on by jurors, such as rape 
myths (e.g. Leverick, 2020).  
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Ultimately, more work is needed to translate these findings into appropriate policy for use in 
practice. Future research should consider how directions would be selected for inclusion in a 
particular case, or whether a generalised direction covering a range of information relating to 
memory could be effective in all cases largely reliant on memory. Directions should also be 
tested in a more realistic jury format, and across a wider range of cases. However, this paper 
makes the case that jurors are likely to be making decisions relating to memory that are at 
odds with established scientific research, that current directions are unlikely to be sufficient 
to correct this effectively, and that there are promising alternative and evidence-based 
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Turnbull direction example (Judicial College, 2020) 
 
NOTE: Not all of the following directions need to be given in every case, as shown by the 
headings. It is suggested that the order is logical but it is for the judge to decide which 
directions are appropriate and the order in which they should be given.  
 
In every case  
 
You must be cautious when considering this evidence because experience has shown that any 
witness who has identified a person can be mistaken even when the witness is honest and 
sure that he/she is right. Such a witness may seem convincing but may be wrong.  
 
[In a “recognition” case: This is true even though a witness knows a person well and says that 
he/she has recognised that person. The witness could still be mistaken.]  
 
You can only rely on the identification evidence if you are sure that it is accurate. You need 
to consider carefully all the circumstances in which D was identified. So you must ask 
yourselves:  
• For how long could W see the person W says was D and, in particular, for how long could 
W see the person's face?  
• How clear was W's view of the person, considering the distance between them, the light, 
any objects or people getting in the way and any distractions.  
• Had W ever seen D before the incident? If so, how often and in what circumstances? If only 
once or occasionally, had W any special reason for remembering D? 
• How long was it between the time of the incident and the time when W identified D to the 
police?  
• Is there any significant difference between the description W gave of the person and D's 
appearance?  
 
You should also think about whether there is any evidence which, if you accept it, might 
support the identification. In particular you should consider {specify}. 
 
However the evidence of {specify} cannot support the identification because {explain}.  
 
You will also have to look to see if there are any weaknesses in any of the identification 
evidence, or if there is any evidence which, if you accept it, might undermine the 
identification evidence. In particular, you should consider {specify}.  
 
In a case where there has been evidence of identification and description  
 
In this case you have identification evidence and description evidence.  
 
Identification evidence is where a witness has identified a specific person by {e.g. naming the 
person / pointing the person out (whether in the street or at an identification procedure)}.  
 
Description evidence is where a witness has given a description which may or may not be 
similar to the appearance or clothing of a particular person. However, the description alone 
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does not identify that person, so it can only go to support other evidence, including evidence 
of identification.  
 
Where there has been an issue arising from a VIPER identification procedure  
 
You have heard that D was picked out on a VIPER identification procedure from a number of 
images that had been selected by D and D’s solicitor. {Summarise issue/s arising and 
evidence relating to those issues.}  
 
Where the defence is alibi  
 
I have already explained how you should consider the evidence of D's alibi.  
 
If you decide that D lied about where he/she was, this does not prove that W’s identification 
must be right. But if you decide that D had no innocent reason for putting this alibi forward, 
you may treat D’s false alibi as some support for W's identification.  
 
Of course, if you are sure that W's evidence of identification is reliable, it would follow that 
D's alibi is false.  
 
Where there has been a breach of Code D  
 
The fact that no identification procedure took place broke the rules that should be followed in 
cases involving disputed identification. These rules, known as the Code of Practice, are 
designed to provide safeguards for a suspect whom a witness says he/she can identify, and to 
test the ability of the witness to identify the suspect.  
 
The failure to hold a formal identification procedure has deprived D of an important 
safeguard which would have tested W’s ability to make an identification under formal and 
fair conditions. You must bear that in mind when considering the reliability of W’s 
identification.  
 
As no identification procedure was carried out in this case, W's ability to identify a suspect 
was not tested in this way and D has not had the advantage D might have had if W had failed 
to pick D out or had picked out another person. 
 
You should take all this into account when you decide whether or not you can be sure that 
W's identification of D was reliable, and you should ask yourselves whether the fact that 


















Before you read the case facts, the judge gives this information: 
Eyewitness evidence is important in this case. You should be aware that when considering 
cases involving eyewitness evidence there is a need for caution to avoid the risk of injustice.  
 
• A witness who is honest and convinced in his or her own mind may be wrong. 
• A witness who is convincing may be wrong 
• A witness who is able to recognise the defendant, even when the witness knows the 
defendant very well, may be wrong.  
 
It is possible for a witness to mistakenly identify a defendant because of having seen or heard 
about the defendant in another context. You should consider this possibility when evaluating 




Research on memory distortion has shown that information obtained after an event can 
change what a person remembers, and even create false memories. Anyone’s memory for an 
event can be inaccurate, even when the person is honestly reporting what they think that they 
saw.  
 
One type of memory inaccuracy occurs where a person mistakenly identifies someone as 
having done something because the person feels familiar to them. This can happen where the 
witness to an event sees a face that is familiar to them, and mistakenly links it to that event. 
In the context of witnesses to crimes, this means that people sometimes misidentify people 
who they saw at the scene of a crime or after a crime, as people who committed the crime.  
 
Researchers have identified a number of reasons that this happens: 
 
First, the effect can occur from what are known as source monitoring mistakes. Source 
monitoring mistakes happen where people accidentally link experiences with the wrong 
source, for example where they think something happened in real life when in actually 
happened in a dream. In the same way, when people see a person that is familiar, they can be 
mistaken about why the person is familiar. In criminal cases, this can result in a witness to a 
crime linking an innocent but familiar person with the crime. A sense of familiarity with the 
person leads the witness to identify them incorrectly.  
  
For example, in one case, an eyewitness expert was accused of being the person who 
committed a crime, by a victim who had seen him on television. The television exposure of 
the expert made him familiar to the witness, but the witness confused the source of the 
familiarity. 
 
Second, the effect can occur where during the encoding of memory a witness thinks that two 
people are actually the same person. For example, if a witness sees one person pick up a 
computer and walk out of a room and then sees another person walk back into the room with 
the computer, the witness may mistakenly believe that the people are the same person. In 
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criminal cases, this can result in a witness to a crime mistakenly thinking that someone did a 
crime when actually they were only present at the scene of the crime.  
  
For example, in one research study, people viewed a theft in a supermarket. The person who 
did the theft walked into a supermarket aisle and an innocent person then emerged from that 
aisle. More than half of the people who viewed the event mistakenly thought that the 
innocent person and the person who did the theft were the same person, and therefore 
mistakenly identified the innocent person as a criminal.  
 
It is important to consider the possibility for misidentifications of this type when evaluating 
witness testimony.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
